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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                    
NO. 05-4560
                                   
KENNETH ANDERSON,
                          Appellant
v.
BUREAU OF PRISONS;
WARDEN USP LEWISBURG JOSEPH V. SMITH;
REGIONAL DIRECTOR D. SCOTT DODRILL;
ADMINISTRATOR HARRELL WATTS,
National Inmate Appeal, Office of General Counsel;
J. HEMPHILL,
Health Service Administrator, USP Lewisburg
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-02666)
   District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 
                                                                         
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
February 9, 2006
BEFORE: ROTH, FUENTES and VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: April 11, 2006)
                                              
 OPINION
                                              
2PER CURIAM
Kenneth Anderson appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  We will dismiss the appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  
In December 2004, Anderson filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs–an ongoing knee and lower back condition.  Specifically, Anderson claimed the
defendants misdiagnosed his knee and back pain and provided “conservative” treatments
that were ineffective.  For relief, Anderson sought an independent medical evaluation, an
MRI, and damages.  
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment
arguing that Anderson failed to state a claim for relief.  The District Court granted
defendants’ motion and dismissed Anderson’s complaint.  The District Court also denied
Anderson’s motion for injunctive relief.   Anderson timely filed a notice of appeal.  
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Having granted
Anderson leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, we must now determine whether
his appeal should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  An appeal may be
dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has no arguable basis in law or fact.  Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  Summary judgment is proper only if there is no
genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See
     1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
3
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).    
With respect to defendant Hemphill, Anderson’s Bivens1 action fails because
Hemphill, as USP-Lewisburg’s Health Services Administrator, is a member of the United
States Public Health Service (USPHS).  See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 107 (2d
Cir. 2000) (under 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), members of the Public Health Service are immune
from suit in a Bivens action if the injury for which compensation is sought resulted from
the performance of a medical or related function while acting within the scope of their
office or employment).  Anderson’s exclusive remedy for injuries caused by a member of
the USPHS is against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.      
§ 2671, et. seq.    
The Eighth Amendment “requires prison officials to provide basic medical
treatment to those [] incarcerated.”  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).  To establish a medical claim based on the
Eighth Amendment, an inmate must allege acts or omissions by prison officials
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.  See
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004).  Without the requisite mental state,
a prison official’s conduct alone will not constitute deliberate indifference.  See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994).  Negligence, unsuccessful medical treatment, or
medical malpractice do not give rise to a successful claim, and an inmate’s disagreement
4with medical treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference.  See Durmer v.
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68-69 (3d Cir. 1993).  Also, a civil rights claim cannot be
premised on a theory of respondeat superior.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Rather, each named defendant must be shown, via the complaint’s
allegations, to have been personally involved in the events or occurrences alleged by the
plaintiff to be unlawful.  Id.  
In this case, the District Court noted that because the Bureau of Prisons defendants
(Warden Smith, Regional Director Dodrill, or Administrator Watts) are not health
workers, Anderson failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference
against them.  We agree.  See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 (stating that prison personnel who
were not physicians could not be considered deliberately indifferent for failing to respond
to an inmate’s medical needs when the inmate was already receiving treatment from the
prison’s medical staff).  Moreover, none of the defendants is alleged to have any direct
contact with Anderson regarding his medical care concerns.  Anderson simply identifies
the defendants by their titles in his complaint and does not mention them anywhere in his
statement of the claim.  As there is no respondeat superior liability in a civil rights action,
he cannot hold these defendants responsible for the acts of their subordinates simply
because of their supervisory positions.  See Rode 845 F.2d at 1207.  Furthermore, we
agree with the District Court that his allegations do no more than allege “mere”
negligence.  See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67.
For the foregoing reasons, Anderson’s appeal will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.
5§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of legal merit. 
